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ABSTRACT
ATTENTION DURING ACTION IN INFANCY
FEBRUARY 2005
RENEE L. CARRICO, B.S., UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
M.S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Neil. E. Berthier
Throughout development, infants are continually adding new skills to their
behavioral, cognitive and perceptual repertoire. During the period in which these skills
are new, they require some degree of controlled processing, and present the potential to
reduce resources available for other cognitive or motor activities. The current study
examined the function of attention in managing concurrent demands of cognitive and
perceptual-motor processes in 24 month-old children. A primary cognitive task
(nonspatial working memory search) was combined with one of three secondary action
tasks (requiring high, reduced, or minimal levels of controlled processing), in order to tax
attentional resources to the point that performance on the primary search task would
suffer. Significant disruptions in search performance were observed with the introduction
of a secondary task, but the expected differential interference effects based on level of
controlled processing were largely absent. Those conditions which required conti oiled
processing showed no added interference compared to conditions with lessened 01 no
vi
controlled processing requirements. The primary costs to search performance seem to be
incurred as children encounter a new task and shift their focus away from the initial task
If children experience any differential effects due to cognition-action resource conflicts,
they appear to be masked by the significant effects of disengaging and reengaging with
the primary search task.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A. Models of Attentional Processing
A long-standing debate in developmental research is the degree to which infants'
performance on many standard cognitive tasks accurately represents their understanding
or cognitive abilities, or is instead limited by unrelated task demands such as motor
responses, means-end requirements, or response inhibition. For example, an area of
contentious debate in recent years has centered around questions of infants' understanding
of the existence and physical properties of objects. Although infants younger than 8
months-of-age generally fail at the standard Piagetian search task, studies of looking time
have provided evidence that much younger infants may have a relatively well-developed
object concept, and infants' poor search may in fact reflect a difficulty in coordinating
motor responses, forming means-end sequences, or other latent task demands
(Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wassennan, 1985; Baillargeon, 1993). Recent publications have
added the possibility of cognitive or attentional resource conflicts to this list of factors
other than knowledge which may be reflected in infants' performance on developmental
tasks (Boudreau & Bushnell, 2001; Berthier, et al., 2001; Needham, 1999).
One commonality among many theories of adult visual attention is the concept of
[United capacity. According to a traditional limited capacity model, the brain has finite
resources for processing incoming perceptual information; thus a fundamental purpose ot
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attention is to prevent overload of the system by reducing the quantity of information to
be processed. Attention serves to highlight certain information, selecting it for
processing, while either attenuating the signal strength or preventing further processing of
unselected information. Such limited processing resources effectively create an
attentional bottleneck, before which selection must take place, (see Allport, 1989 for a
review). Information about the physical properties or spatial location of objects was
often presumed to involve relatively basic levels of visual processing; selection for this
type of information was thought to occur at an early stage of processing. In contrast,
semantic content might require more complex processing, and as such its selection would
occur later during visual processing.
Neurological evidence offers an alternate perspective to "early" versus "late"
selection in visual processing, suggesting that differential processing of visual
information may be better characterized by "what" versus "how" (Goodale & Milner,
1992). Visual information originating in striate cortex diverges into two specialized
processing streams, one for information about object identity, and another for information
in the service of performing action. For example, different pathways are used for
identifying a particular component of a visual scene as "a cat" and for processing the
visual information necessary to pick the cat up (e.g. its location, size, posture, orientation,
etc.). Visual information pertaining to object identification appears to be processed along
a ventral pathway from striate cortex to inferotemporal cortex - the so-called "what"
pathway. Visual control of action takes place along a dorsal pathway from striate cottex
to posterior parietal cortex - the "how" pathway (Goodale & Milner, 1992).
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These specialized processing streams may reflect differences in the requirements
of object recognition and control of action. Recognition implies a retrospective
orientation, comparing a current visual scene with stored information used to identify an
object, whereas control of action is necessarily prospective in nature, anticipating future
conditions in order to appropriately plan future actions. Similarly, visual recognition
must use an allocentric frame of reference - in general, an object's identity remains
constant through spatial rotation and translation, and the visual system must be able to
recognize a given object without regard to a particular viewpoint. In contrast, spatial
orientation and location are of principal importance when acting on an object, so visual
control systems mandate an egocentric frame of reference (Bertenthal, 1996).
It is thus apparent that the visual control of action requires a frame of reference
and orientation fundamentally different from that of object recognition, and furthermore
takes place along specialized neural pathways (i.e. the dorsal stream). But what visual
information enters the dorsal processing stream? How (or even why) is any particular
subset of visual information initially selected as relevant to the control of action?
The necessity of some mechanism by which only the visual information necessary
for controlling a desired action (instead of all available information) is selected for
specialized processing becomes more clear when we consider that the motor response
system has physical limitations that the visual system does not (Allport, 1987). While the
visual system may perceive many objects in a scene simultaneously, a given set ot
effectors can only carry out one motor response at a time. This paring down of the
available perceptual input to more closely match the response output has been called
selection-for-action (Allport, 1987, 1989). By the process ot selective cueing,
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information relevant to a task is designated for use in the control of an action, bringing
attentional focus to register the sensory information necessary for response control.
Selection-for-action thus provides a way to spotlight only that perceptual information
which is relevant to performing the selected action.
Even if the visual input processed by an action system is reduced to only task-
relevant information, the possibility for processing to be restricted by some manner of
capacity limitation remains. In contrast to other limited-capacity models described above
(e.g. early v. late selection), Schneider and Shiffrin (1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977)
proposed that the locus of limited capacity lies not in the initial selection and processing
of perceptual information, but rather in the executive control of processing. They
propose that one system (or collection of mechanisms) selects and processes task-relevant
information, while a separate control system supervises and operates upon it. It is this
control system which is said to be limited in its processing capacity, and processes which
require the supervision of this control system must therefore share or compete for its
resources. Not all processes require the active supervision of this control system,
however. Automatic processes occur when environmental or internal cues activate a
learned sequence of response elements, which is then executed automatically. These
processes take place without the subject's conscious control or attention, and are not
subject to the capacity limits of the control system. Controlled processes , in comparison,
occur when cues activate a temporary, unlearned sequence of response elements. The
execution of these processes engages the active supervision of the control system, often
requires conscious attention and subject control, and is subject to the capacity limitations
of the control system (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).
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A variety of task demands and situational factors may determine whether an
action requires controlled or automatic processing. In general, difficult or newly learned
actions require controlled processing, and routine, over-leamed, or easy tasks are likely to
be processed more automatically (Passingham, 1996). However, even those actions
which are normally processed automatically may be brought under conscious control
when necessary (Norman & Shallice, 1986): for example, driving under difficult or
dangerous road conditions requires more controlled processing, even for an experienced
driver. Certain types of tasks are especially likely to require attentional control and
processing resources for their execution: those tasks that involve planning or decision
making, require troubleshooting, are ill learned or involve novel action sequences, are
dangerous or technically difficult, and those that require the individual to overcome
habitual responses (Norman & Shallice, 1986).
One consequence of the limited capacity of a supervisory control system is the
potential for resource conflicts between concurrent tasks. At a local level, any tasks
which share the same neural pathways will interfere with each other. At a more global
level, whatever limited resources are available must be distributed among the many
cognitive and perceptual-motor processes in progress (Ruff& Rothbart, 1996). In a
sense, the number of activities one can engage in at any time is limited by the total effort
required. It may be possible to engage in many simple tasks concurrently without any
substantial decrement in performance, but difficult tasks require greater effort and more
resources, and consequently will suffer if they must be performed along with other tasks.
Total cognitive processing capacity is fixed at any given point, but may fluctuate over
time according to state and task demands, as well as over the course of development
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(Ruff& Rothbart, 1996). In order to mitigate the detrimental effects of resource conflicts
on performance, an executive system is needed to manage the allocation of processing
capacity.
Norman and Shallice (1986) propose that these functions are managed by the
Supervisory Attentional System (SAS). This system governs the allocation of attentional
resources among potentially competing cognitive or motor processes. It is important to
here note that, while we have up to this point largely been considering resource conflicts
only among perceptual-motor processes, the same potential for resource conflicts exists
among cognitive processes, as well as between cognitive and perceptual-motor processes.
According to the Norman-Shallice theory, distinct program-like elements
(schemas) exist for the control of each basic, well-learned cognitive and motor operation.
Each schema has an activation level, determined by a variety of factors, which roughly
reflects its degree of appropriateness in the current task. Once a schema's activation level
passes a certain threshold, it is executed. However, in any task - controlled or automatic -
many different cognitive and/or motor schemas may be appropriate, but only a subset of
these can actually be executed. In the case of automatic processes, schemas are selected
according to contention scheduling. In simple contention scheduling, the relative
activation levels of schemas determine their priority for use of any shared processing
resources. For instance, if a task triggers two incompatible motor response schemas, the
schema with the higher activation level will gain access to the relevant motor controllers
and be executed, to the exclusion of the other response.
During controlled processing, in contrast, the necessary cognitive or motor
processes may not be sufficiently automated lor simple contention scheduling to
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effectively resolve resource conflicts. In this case, the Supervisory Attentional System
indirectly allocates additional resources to preferred schemas by increasing their
activation levels, and raising their priority for shared resources. Rather than directly
controlling the selection of schemas, the SAS manipulates schema selection only
indirectly, essentially biasing the contention scheduling process. Deliberate, conscious
attentional control, increased motivation, and other dispositional factors likewise
indirectly affect schema selection, by activating the SAS (Norman & Shallice, 1986).
In sum, any consideration of the role of attention during action should take into
account the likelihood of inherent capacity limits at some level of processing, the
potential for resource conflicts to occur among competing processes, and the role of an
executive control system in managing resource allocation and supervising controlled
processes. When we perform any action, the attentional system serves to highlight
sensory information relevant to the performance of our chosen action, resolves any
conflicts that arise over shared processing or other resources, and selects appropriate
processes to execute from among the various alternatives. When we attempt to perform
multiple actions simultaneously, the degree to which they are likely to interfere with one
another depends upon whether they compete for common neural or effector systems, and
whether they must compete for the limited processing resources of an executive or
supervisory control system.
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B . Neuropsychology of Attention during Action
Neuropsychology gives some insight into what neural systems might be involved
in these components of attention during action, pointing to roles for both dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex in response selection and
controlled processing. For example, greater activation (regional cerebral blood flow as
recorded by positron emission tomography) is found in DLPFC and anterior cingulate for
willed action versus automatic responses (Jenkins et al., 2000; Frith, Friston, Liddle, &
Frackowiak, 1991), new learning versus overleamed responses (Passingham, 1996;
Jueptner et al., 1997), and attended versus unattended actions (Jueptner et al., 1997).
Significantly, these tasks share a common requirement for controlled processing: recall
that controlled processing is necessary when a response is newly learned or requires
conscious attention or control, while automatic processing is thought to occur in cases of
overleamed responses and responses which do not require conscious control.
Furthermore, there are indications that different types of controlled processing
may involve different levels of DLPFC and anterior cingulate activation. Jueptner et al.
(1997) demonstrated that newly learned movement sequences show higher DLPFC and
anterior cingulate activation than preleamed but consciously attended sequences, which
in turn show higher activation than overleamed (not consciously attended) sequences.
Dual task interference also provides converging evidence for PFC and anterior
cingulate activation. If two tasks engage the same neural pathways or processing
systems, there will be response interference, and one or both tasks will incur a decrease in
performance. Passingham (1996) had adults learn an arbitrary sequence ot fingei
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movements by trial-and-error. On some trials, subjects were required to simultaneously
perform a verbal task, either noun repetition or verb generation. These tasks were chosen
because verb generation is known to activate PFC, while noun repetition is a routine task
which does not activate PFC. More errors and longer response times in movement
sequences were found when the simultaneous task was verb generation than when it was
noun repetition. Additionally, this task interference was greater early in the session,
when the finger sequences were newly learned, and decreased as the motor response
became more routine.
Adult humans with lesions of prefrontal cortex have deficits in a variety of action
situations which have in common the need for controlled processing (see Shallice &
Burgess, 1993 for a review). Shallice and Burgess speculate that the Supervisory
Attentional System is located in the prefrontal cortex - hence, lesions of prefrontal cortex
should reveal how processing occurs in the absence of the SAS, by unmodulated
contention scheduling. An unmodulated contention scheduling system selects schemas
for execution based on activation level, where activation levels are determined solely by
environmental triggers. Therefore, in tasks which strongly trigger a schema, responses
are dominated by that schema, and behavioral perseveration will result. Conversely,
tasks which lack a salient trigger will not strongly cue any particular schema, and
distractibility will be evident. In fact, adults with prefrontal lesions show just such
perseveration on tasks with strong environmental triggers, and distractibility on tasks
without strong environmental cues (Shallice & Burgess, 1993).
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C. Attention during Action in Infancy
In contrast to the extensive theoretical framework of attention found in literature
on adult cognition, research on infant attention has tended to focus on the behavioral and
biological correlates of overt attention. Although concepts of adult attention can be
profitably applied to the study of infant attention, it is unlikely that adult and infant
attentional systems are identical in capacity and/or function. For instance, development
in early infancy brings a closer coupling of cardiac and somatic systems during visual
attention (Byrne & Miller, 1988), perhaps allowing for greater control in the maintenance
and disengagement of sustained attention. Infants may have less total processing
capacity, and may be less efficient at allocating the processing resources available to
them. Indeed, there is evidence that the efficiency of capacity allocation, and dual-task
performance, may continue to improve throughout the elementary school years (Manis,
Keating, & Morrison, 1980; Hiscock, Kinsboume, Samuels, & Krause, 1985).
Perhaps most significantly, many basic cognitive and motor operations (e.g.
simple problem solving, reaching), for the most part processed automatically in the adult,
are more likely to require controlled processing during infancy. This could present some
difficulty for infant research, in which behavioral responses are used as indicators of
cognitive abilities, generally under the assumption that motor tasks are relatively pure
indexes of, or at least do not actively interfere with, the cognitive ability of interest.
However, we know that newly learned skills demand controlled processing, and thus
present the potential to reduce resources available for other cognitive or motor activities.
Ruff and Rothbart (1996) point to this potential conflict: "Emerging motor skills
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themselves require attention, so for a time the child’s attention may not be free to be
directed to other aspects of the immediate environment or task" (p. 169). In studying
early cognitive development, it appears we face an increased likelihood of task
interference between the cognitive skills we seek to understand and the motor skills used
to assess them.
Several factors suggest what types of experimental situations are likely to involve
resource conflicts due to the attentional demands of cognition or action. Overall, tasks
which heavily tax the central executive system (SAS) by requiring extensive controlled
processing (due to difficulty, conscious attention, planning, decision making, etc.) are
most likely to suffer task interference or decreased performance. Which specific
cognitive or motor tasks do so will, to a large degree, be age-dependent. Throughout
development, infants are continually adding new skills to their behavioral, cognitive and
perceptual repertoire. During the period in which these skills are new, they require some
degree of controlled processing. As activities are practiced, they become less effortful,
processing becomes more automated, and attentional resources are freed for other
processes. For example the need to coordinate even simple reaching for an object may
occupy a young infant's full attention, interfering with the infant's ability to appropriately
use whatever object knowledge they may have (Bushnell & Boudreau, 1993; Needham,
1999). Even infants skilled at reaching may be subject to such attentional conflicts, given
a challenging enough task. When Berthier et al. (2001) had 9 month-old infants reach tor
a swiftly rolling ball whose path was blocked by a partially occluded barrier, infants
incorrectly anticipated the ball's reemergence, failing to take into account the presence ot
the barrier. Furthermore, they were unable to locate the hidden ball at trial's end.
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suggesting an insufficient representation of the spatial layout of ball, track, and barrier.
However, when infants were allowed to observe the trials without reaching, search
improved dramatically (Berthier & Carrico, submitted). Taken together, these studies
demonstrate that the attentional demands of coordinating a difficult reach can interfere
with infants' abilities to process and appropriately act upon spatial information.
The potential for resource conflict between cognitive and motor tasks is, of
course, bidirectional. Boudreau and Bushnell (2001) found that increasing the difficulty
of a reaching movement interfered with infants' discrimination learning, and conversely,
a cognitively challenging goal interfered with the planning and execution of a reach.
They describe this conflict as an "attention driven cognition-action trade-off' (Boudreau
& Bushnell, 2001).
Finally, resource conflicts may arise between any concurrent tasks which utilize
the same neural processing pathways. Tasks that involve activation of prefrontal cortex
(e.g. those involving inhibition, planning, etc) may pose a particular problem, as PFC is
the presumed location of the central processing executive (SAS). As such, resource
competition may arise between portions of a task which involve various PFC activities
and those that, by virtue of their need for controlled processing, also activate PFC.
D. The Current Study
The current study sought to further examine the potential for attention-based
resource conflicts between cognition and action in late infancy. As there are very tew
studies explicitly designed to investigate these issues (Boudreau & Bushnell, 2001;
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Berthier & Carrico, submitted), many interesting questions remain about the function of
attention in managing concurrent demands of cognitive and perceptual-motor processes.
In particular, the current study investigated the following questions: Can performing a
difficult action interfere with children's working memory abilities? And can training
reduce these resource conflicts in children, as has been shown with adults (Passingham,
1996; Jueptner et al., 1997)?
The method of the current study was based loosely on a three-location search task
designed by Petrides (1995) for use with monkeys, and subsequently employed by
Diamond and colleagues (1997) as a test of working memory and prefrontal cortical
function in human infants. In the basic task, three hiding boxes are baited with rewards,
and subjects are required to empty the boxes one by one. Because the positions of the
boxes are scrambled between reaches, subjects cannot rely on a simple spatial strategy for
search, but instead must remember past searches on the basis of perceptual cues such as
the color and shape of the boxes themselves. The task has been used as an index of non-
spatial working memory, as success requires that subjects integrate memory for a series
of past actions, and use that memory in the service of planning the next action. The
neural locus for this task is presumed to be dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, based on work
by Petrides (1995) with DLPFC-lesioned monkeys.
In the current study, a challenging motor component was added to the cognitive
working memory task, in order to create a situation where shared attentional resources
might be taxed to the point that working memory performance would suffer. This motor
component was expected to consume attentional resources by requiring controlled
processing, which is necessary for actions that are difficult or newly learned, and tor
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novel action sequences (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Passingham, 1996). Children were
required to unfasten a difficult latch before accessing and searching the hiding boxes in
the cognitive task. We predicted that the additional attentional demands imposed by the
controlled processing necessary to unfasten the latch would disrupt children's working
memory for which boxes they have previously searched, and/or the planning of
subsequent searches.
An additional experimental group was given further training with manipulating
the latch, in an attempt to reduce the level of controlled processing necessary to perform
the motor task. Newly learned or difficult actions require controlled processing, but as
these actions become routine or over-learned, processing becomes increasingly
automatic. Passingham (1996) found that a difficult motor task caused significant
interference with a concurrent cognitive task, but that this interference diminished as
subjects gained experience with the motor task. We predicted that, if additional training
with the latch reduced its difficulty (and thus its need for controlled processing), children
in this group would suffer less decrement in performance than children who were given
no supplemental training, and for whom the action still required controlled processing.
Because our aim was to examine possible performance decreases in the working
memory task with the addition of a challenging action component, it was necessary to
select an age group who could perform the cognitive task well enough that any
performance decrements would be detectable, and for whom the latch would be operable
but sufficiently challenging. Computer simulations revealed that a child using a
completely random search pattern would open all three boxes in an average of five
searches. In piloting with a range of ages, we found that most 24 month-old children
14
performed better than chance on the search task. Additionally, these children seemed
most engaged in the task, and were able to operate the latch with some effort. As a result,
24 month-old children were chosen for participation.
15
CHAPTER II
METHOD
A. Participants
Sixty-four 24 month-old children participated in this study. Children were
recruited from Massachusetts state birth records, and contacted by an introductory letter
and a follow-up phone call. In order to be included in the final sample, children had to
perform better than chance during the baseline phase (i.e. their mean search performance
across baseline blocks was less than 5 searches), and were required to complete a
minimum of three Test blocks. Twenty-two children were excluded from analyses due to
fussiness/incomplete session (N = 17), because they performed worse than chance on the
baseline trials (N = 4), or due to developmental delay (N = 1). Of the forty-two children
included in analyses, fourteen participated in each of three experimental groups (Action,
Observation, and Training). Participant information is detailed in Table 1.
Table 1. Participant Information
Action Observation Training
Mean Age
(months: days)
24:16 24:15 24:19
Age Range 24:2 - 24:27 24:3 - 24:29 24:1 -24:28
# Male 6 4 6
# Female 8 10 8
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B. Stimuli and App;munv
Children in all groups participated in the same cognitive working memory task,
with identical stimuli. Children were presented with three lidded boxes, in which small
food rewards were hidden. The boxes differed both in shape and color (red circle, blue
square, and yellow hexagon), but all measured approximately 7 cm in diameter and 5 cm
in height, and had easily removable lids (see Figure 1). The boxes were mounted on
identical 1 1 cm square fiberboard bases, to ensure the boxes remained a consistent 4 cm
distance from each other when their bases were abutted.
Figure 1 . Hiding boxes presented to children in all groups.
The boxes were presented on a table (60 cm square x 65 cm high) - about waist
height for children when seated on their parent's lap. On some trials, the boxes were
enclosed in a Plexiglas casing (46 cm wide x 24 cm high x 26 cm deep; open to the
experimenter on the back side), which blocked children’s manual access to the hiding
boxes (see Figure 2). This Plexiglas cover had a sliding front panel, fastened by means of
a 2 1/2" silver barrel bolt mounted at the top and center of the sliding panel. When the
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bolt was unlatched, the front panel slid down below the level of the tabletop, allowing
unobstructed access to the hiding boxes.
Figure 2. Hiding boxes enclosed in the Plexiglas casing.
Behavior was recorded by digital video camcorder (Sony DCR-TRV33), placed
behind and to the left of the experimenter. This angle gave a full view of the child’s face,
box choices, and latch manipulation.
C. Procedure
1. Baseline Phase (All Groups)
Children were seated on a parent's lap throughout testing, at a table across from
the experimenter. After a brief warm-up period, during which the child was encouraged
to examine and open a hiding box, the Baseline phase began. For children in the Action
and Observation groups, the Baseline phase consisted of four blocks of trials, with each
block comprising three to eight trials. Because of their additional Training phase trials,
children in the Training group participated in only two blocks of the Baseline phase. We
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hoped Ihis would ensure that children remained engaged throughout the entire session
and provided sufficient data for the Test phase.
Each block of trials began with all three hiding boxes in front of the experimenter
- out of reach but visible to the child. The experimenter opened all three boxes, and
placed a food reward (Goldfish cracker) inside each box. The lids were replaced, and the
boxes pushed forward to within the child's reach. The child was then asked, “Can you
find a cracker? Once the child made contact with a hiding box, the experimenter pulled
the other two boxes back out of reach. If there was a treat in the chosen box, the
experimentei clapped and said, “Good job, you found it!” and encouraged the child to
remove and eat the cracker. If the chosen box was empty, the experimenter said, “Oh no,
it's empty.” The experimenter then retrieved the chosen box, rearranged all three boxes
into a new order (see below), pushed the boxes within reach, and said to the child, “Ok,
can you find another?” Trials continued in this manner until the child emptied all three
boxes, or to a maximum of 8 attempts (at which point the experimenter opened all the
lids to reveal the final hidden crackers). The experimenter then began a new block of
trials by opening and baiting all three boxes, and repeating the above procedure.
The hiding boxes were arranged across trials in a pseudo-random order. Piloting
experience, as well as other research (Diamond, Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997;
Berthier, et al., 2000), indicated that some children are prone to perseverative reaching to
a particular spatial location or object. Repeated reaching to one hiding box guarantees
poor performance, as the child can only be successful on the first retrieval. However,
because the hiding boxes change location from trial to trial, it would be possible for a
child to perseverate to one location and successfully empty all boxes. In order to guard
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against this possibility, and help distinguish children who are actively solving the task
from those who simply prefer a given location, orders were devised such that no child
could be successful in the minimum three reaches by reaching only to a single location.
In addition, orders were balanced so that each box appeared in each location (left, center,
and right) approximately the same number of times. Hiding boxes were presented to
children in the following four orders (R=Red box, B=Blue box, Y=Yellow box; orders
are from the child's point of view):
Block 1: YBR, RYB, YBR, RBY, YRB, BRY, BRY, RYB
Block 2: BYR, RBY, RBY, YBR, RYB, YRB, BYR, YRB
Block 3: RYB, BRY, BRY, YRB, RBY, YBR, RYB, YBR
Block 4: YRB, BYR, YRB, RYB, YBR, RBY, RBY, BYR
After the Baseline phase, children in the Training group participated in a Training
phase, whereas children in the Action and Observation groups continued on to the Test
phase.
2. Training Phase (Training Group only)
After two blocks of Baseline trials, children in the Training group participated in a
Training phase, which gave them the practice manipulating and opening the barrel-bolt
latch before the Test phase. The experimenter installed the Plexiglas casing over the
table, and demonstrated to the child how to open the latch. The child was then allowed to
manipulate the latch, and practice opening it once with the experimenter giving assistance
as needed. The experimenter then placed a yellow rubber duck on the table, raised the
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front panel, fastened the latch, and asked the child, "Can you get the duckie?" (see Figure
3). The child was encouraged to unfasten the latch in order to retrieve the duck, again
given verbal instruction as necessary. This procedure was repeated six times, after which
the Test phase began.
Figure 3. Training trials
3. Test Phase - Action and Training Groups
Upon completion of the Baseline (for the Action group) or Training (for the
Training group) phase, children began the Test phase. If not already present, the
Plexiglas casing was installed on the table, enclosing the hiding boxes. For the Action
group, the experimenter demonstrated how to operate the latch once before the trials
began.
All trials began with the front sliding panel in the closed position, with the latch
fastened. As in the Baseline phase, the boxes were baited, closed, and pushed to within
the child's reach. The experimenter then said, “Can you find a cracker?” The child was
encouraged to open the latch, at which point the front panel slid open, and the child was
able to choose a box. When the child contacted a box, the others were pulled out of
reach. After the child emptied the chosen box, it too was closed and pulled out of reach.
The front panel was then closed and latched, and the boxes rearranged for the next trial.
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Trials followed the same orders as during the Baseline phase, and continued through four
blocks, or until the child became fussy or disinterested.
4. Test Phase - Observation Group
In order to provide a control situation for the Action task, one group of children
participated in an observation only Test phase. This was identical to the Test phase
described above, with the exception that the experimenter, rather than the child,
manipulated and unfastened the latch. In order to equate the length of delay before
searching, as well as the amount of time the child was visually disengaged from the
hiding boxes during latch manipulation, each child in the Observation group was
randomly yoked to a child in the Action group. For each Observation trial, the
experimenter manipulated the latch for the same amount of time as the matched Action
group child had. The mean latch delay within a given block was used on trials where the
Observation child continued to search past the number of searches completed by the
paired Action group child. As a result of matching latch manipulation times, any
differences in performance between the Action and Observation groups should be
attributable to the attentional demands imposed by the child's physical manipulation of
the latch, rather than simply the length of delay or visual disengagement.
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D. Data Scoring
Dependent measures assessed from the video data included box chosen on each
trial and its position, number of searches to empty all three boxes (Search Performance),
number of errors, and type of error. Errors were scored as either perseveration to Box,
perseveration to Location, Indeterminate, or Other. Errors were judged to be
perseverative when the child reached to the same location or box as chosen on the
preceding trial, regardless of whether the child had previously found a reward there or
not. Errors were scored as Indeterminate when the child chose the same box as on the
previous trial, and that box was in the same location for both trials, thus making it
impossible to determine whether the perseveration was to the box or location. Searches
in error to a new box in a new location were coded as Other.
Number of discrete latch manipulations, total duration of latch manipulation, and
total delay were also scored for the Action and Training groups. A latch manipulation
was defined as a discrete instance of contact with the latch during which the child
attempted to explore, move, or manipulate the latch mechanism. The duration (in
seconds) of each of these latch manipulations was summed to determine the total duration
of latch manipulation for each trial. Total delay was calculated as the time from first
contact with the latch to its opening, and was used as the experimenter’s manipulation
time in the Observation group.
All video data were scored by a primary observer, with a second observer scoring
one third of the data to ensure inter-observer reliability. On trials where disagreement
occurred, the primary observer’s score was used. Observers agreed on box choice on 100
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percent of trials, and 99.6 percent of the time on number of discrete latch manipulations.
Observers agreed to within 4 video frames (0.13 seconds) on 92.5 percent of observations
of the beginning and end of latch manipulations.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
A. Baseline Phase
Most children found the working memory search task to be engaging, and almost
all were able to solve the task; of the sixty-four children who participated, only four
failed to perform better than chance during the Baseline phase. Of the forty-two children
included in analyses, fourteen children participated in each of the three experimental
groups (Action, Observation, and Training). Initial analyses revealed no significant
effects of sex for mean search performance [F (1, 36) = .31, p < .58] or average latch
manipulation times [F (1, 24) = .001, p < .97]. As such, all reported analyses collapse
across sex as a factor.
As noted above, the experimental protocol during the Baseline phase was
identical for all groups, with the exception that Action and Observation groups took part
in four trial blocks, whereas the Training group took part in only two blocks. We first
analyzed children’s search performance on these Baseline trials. Mean search
performance (number of searches to empty all three boxes) was 4.25 for the Action
group, 3.87 for the Observation group, and 3.46 for the Training group. A one-way
ANOVA revealed this difference to be significant [F (2, 39) = 4.70, p < .015]. Further
analysis determined that Baseline block 3 of the Action group was responsible for this
difference [F (1, 25) - 6.91, p < .014] (see Figure 4). One-way ANOVAs showed no
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significant differences between groups for block 1 [F (2, 39) = .55, p < .58], block 2
[F (2, 39) = .9 1
, p < .4 1 ], or block 4 [F ( 1 , 26) = 1 .67, p < .2 1 ]. Furthermore, a
comparison of participants’ final Baseline trials (block 4 for Action and Observation
groups, block 2 for Training group) also found no differences in search performance
[F (2, 39) = 1.61, p < .21].
Baseline Performance
6.00 t
12 3 4
Block #
Figure 4. Search performance on Baseline trials
Because all groups participated in an identical Baseline procedure, and no other
differences were found between children’s performance during the Baseline phase, we
believe it is reasonable to conclude this difference was simply chance variability that rose
to the level of statistical significance. Nevertheless, we took these differences into
account in our analyses of search performance on Test trials, by comparing change scores
as well as raw scores when considering the potential disruptions in search performance
from Baseline to Test.
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B. Training and Test Phases
The introduction of a latch component during the Test phase substantially
interfered with children’s performance on the search task. Whereas all children
performed better than chance during the Baseline phase, 6 (of 14) children in the Action
group, and 8 in the Observation group, fell below chance during the Test phase. Only 3
children in the Training group performed worse than chance during Test trials; however,
analysis revealed this was not a statistically significant difference [x
2
(2) = 2.23, p < .33],
Search Performance
Group
Figure 5. Search Performance on Baseline and Test phases
Mean search performance showed a similar pattern of disruption across groups, as
illustrated in Figure 5. In the Test phase, mean search performance rose to 5.24 for the
Action group, 4.80 for the Observation group, and 4.21 for the Training group. A 3
(Group) x 2 (Phase) repeated measures ANOVA showed this increase was significant
[F (1, 39) = 29.90, p < .0001]. Analyses revealed the Training group required
significantly fewer searches on Test trials than either the Action [t (26) = 2.67, p < .01] or
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Observation [t (26) 2. 1 5, p < .04] groups. Mean search performance on Test trials did
not differ between Action and Observation groups [t (26) = 1.06, p < .30).
As a measure of performance disruption that would not be biased by the
differences found in Baseline trials, we computed change scores for each subject,
subtracting mean performance on the Baseline phase from mean performance on the Test
phase. Mean search performance change was .99 for the Action group, .93 for the
Observation group, and .75 for the Training group; these change scores were not
significantly different [F (2, 39) = .297, p < .75]. Because Training group children
participated in only two Baseline blocks, we also computed change scores based on
differences between children’s search performance on Test blocks and on the average of
their first and last Baseline blocks (blocks 1 and 4 for Action and Observation, blocks 1
and 2 for Training). Analysis of these change scores revealed no group differences
[F (2, 39)= 1.86, p<.48],
Finally, we considered the possibility that any group differences in search
disruption might be greatest at the beginning of the Test phase. However, analysis of
change between the last Baseline block (Baseline block 4 for Action and Observation,
block 2 for Training) and the first Test block revealed no group differences
[F (2, 39) = .03, p < .97], indicating that search performance was similarly disrupted from
Baseline to Test without regard to experimental condition.
We also examined the types and patterns of errors children made in search on
individual trials, across trial blocks, and over the testing session as a whole. Incidence oi
each error type as a proportion of total errors is displayed in Figure 6. On individual
trials, perseverative errors to Box and Location accounted for about the same propoition
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of total errors (.24 and .28, respectively). No single error type emerged as a dominant
iesponse, and patterns ot error were similar for all groups. One-way ANOVAs on
individual error types revealed no group differences for perseveration to Box
[F (2, 39) = .08, p < .93], perseveration to Location [F (2, 39) = .37, p < .69].
Indeterminate [F (2, 39) = 1.65, p < .21], or Other [F (2, 39) = .78, p < .46],
Figure 6. Percent of each error type across groups
Because children of this age frequently display perseverative errors in search, we
identified two measures of perseveration (to either location or box). First, we measured
the maximum number of consecutive searches children made to a single location for each
block of Test trials. For children in the Action group, the mean maximum number of
consecutive searches to the same location was 4.86. For children in the Observation
group, the mean was 4.29 searches, and the mean was 3.64 searches for the Training
group. Pairwise comparisons revealed the Action group showed a significantly greater
number of consecutive searches that the Training group [t (26) = 2.25; p < .03]. No other
comparisons between groups were found to be significant.
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Lastly, we examined whether individual children might be prone to adopting
perseverative search patterns over the course of the testing session. Because it was
possible for children to retrieve all the crackers in the minimum of three searches by
reaching to the same location twice, we established a criterion for location perseveration
whereby children were counted as having a perseverative pattern if, over the entire Test
phase, they reached to any single location on over two-thirds of trials. According to this
criterion, 7 (of 14) children in the Action group, 4 children in the Observation group, and
6 children in the Training group showed a tendency to perseverate to a single location.
Almost all of these children (14 of 17) showed a preference to reach to the center
location. Perseveration to a single box was far less common: across all groups, only one
child directed more than 50% of searches to a single box. There appeared to be no strong
relation between perseveration (to either location or box) and children’s performance on
the search task. Among children in all groups who performed better than chance during
the Test phase, 9 of 24 showed a pattern of perseveration, while 15 did not. Among
children who performed worse than chance, 10 of 18 showed a pattern of perseveration,
while 8 did not. It thus appears that children who perform worse than chance during the
Test phase are not all doing so primarily because of perseverative errors.
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1 . Action Group
Of the fourteen children in the Action group, twelve completed all four Test
blocks, while two children finished only three blocks. The addition of a latch component
to the baseline working memory task interfered significantly with children’s
performance. Mean performance on Baseline trials was 4.25 searches, while mean
performance on Test trials was 5.24 searches [t (13) = -2.95, p < .006], The degree of
this interference varied quite substantially between individuals; mean number of searches
for each child ranged from 3.5 to 8. Likewise, performance changes ranged from a
decrease of 0.75 to an increase of 3.25 from Baseline to Test (mean = .99). Search
performance across test blocks for the Action group, along with that of the Observation
and Training groups, is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. Search performance across Test blocks
Most children found the latch component challenging, and occasionally somewhat
frustrating. The number of discrete manipulations on each trial ranged from 2 to 8, with
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each manipulation lasting anywhere from less than 1 second to more than 40 seconds
(range = 0.30 - 42.26). However, children most commonly opened the latch using a
single continuous manipulation (81% of trials). Children’s facility with the latch varied
considerably, ranging from a mean time of 2.45 seconds to 1 5.67 seconds of latch
manipulation. Mean delays (time from first contact with latch to opening) spanned a
similar range (2.45 to 21.28).
Because we had no direct measure of the cognitive processing demands of the
latch task, we considered duration of latch manipulation to be an indicator of how
difficult the latch task was for each child, and related to the level of processing required.
Practice operating the latch over repeated trials appears to have reduced its difficulty, and
presumably its processing requirements, by significantly reducing the time children
needed to successfully open the latch. Mean latch manipulation times were 1 1.67
seconds on Block 1, 7.08 seconds on Block 2, 6.21 seconds on Block 3, and 4.21 seconds
on Block 4, as shown in Figure 8. Latch times were significantly reduced from Block 1
to Block 2 [t (13) = 3.81, p < .002], After their second block of Test trials, children’s
latch manipulation times did not continue to decrease; Blocks 2, 3, and 4 did not differ
significantly [F (2, 35) = .77, p < .47].
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Figure 8, Mean latch manipulation times for Action group
We also examined the data for evidence of any relation between the length of
latch manipulation times on individual trials and the child’s likelihood of error on those
trials. If processing requirements are lessened as the jatch manipulation becomes more
practiced, we would expect less task interference to be evident on trials with shorter latch
manipulation times. We considered only the most difficult search trials, where two boxes
are empty and only a single reward remains, and found no correlation between the
proportion correct on these trials and either latch manipulation time (r = .03) or total
delay (r = .05). Within this subset of trials, we also compared the latch manipulation
times on correct trials and those where an error was made, and found no significant
differences. Mean latch manipulation time was 6.72 seconds for correct trials, and 5.90
seconds for incorrect trials [t (13) = -.853, p < .41]. Average delay followed a similar
pattern: mean delay was 8.14 seconds on correct trials and 6.86 seconds on incorrect
trials [t (13) = -1.04, p < .32].
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2, Observation Group
All fourteen children in the Observation group completed four Test blocks.
Although children in the Observation group were not required to perform the latch
component, the additional delay and disengagement from the primary task significantly
disrupted performance on the search task [t (13) = 3.68, p < .003; mean Baseline = 3.87,
mean Test = 4.80]. Search performance across test blocks is displayed in Figure 6.
Children’s mean search performance on the Test phase ranged from 3.5 to 6 searches
(mean = 4.8). The change in performance from Baseline to Test also varied considerably
between children, ranging from a decrease of 0.75 to an increase of 3.0 reaches
(mean = .93).
As described in the Methods, each child in the Observation group was yoked to an
Action group child in order to determine the delay imposed while the experimenter
opened the latch during Test trials. Delay times on individual trials ranged from 1 second
to 89 seconds (median = 4). In studying the data for any indication of a relation between
the length of delay and likelihood of error, we found a moderate correlation between
proportion correct (on trials with two empty boxes) and length of delay (r = -.41). A
further test of delay length found no differences between correct and incorrect trials
[t (13) = -1.06, p< .31; mean on correct = 9.69 seconds; mean on incorrect = 7.83
seconds].
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3. Training Group
All children in the Training group participated in a six trial Training phase.
During the Test phase that followed, thirteen of the fourteen children completed all four
blocks, while one child completed only three blocks.
The additional practice given during the Training phase proved helpful to
children, reducing the time it took them to open the latch. During the Training phase,
children used between 1 and 12 manipulations on each trial, lasting from 0.33 to 27.70
seconds each. During the Test phase, the maximum was 6 manipulations on a single trial,
with a range of 0.13 to 24.60 seconds per manipulation. As in the Action group, most
trials (59% during Training, 87 % during Test) included only a single manipulation to
open the latch. Mean latch manipulation times during the Training phase ranged from
1.63 to 36.93 seconds. Mean delays spanned a similar range (1.63 to 59.50 seconds).
Latch manipulation times were substantially lower during the Test phase when
compared to the Training phase. Across all children, mean latch manipulation time was
10.20 seconds during Training, and only 5.26 seconds during Test trials; this difference
was marginally significant [t (12) = 2.05, p < .06]. Once the Training phase was
complete, children’s latch times during the Test phase were consistently low across test
blocks; mean latch manipulation times were 5.48 seconds on Test Block 1, 5.48 seconds
on Test Block 2, 5.8 seconds on Test Block 3, and 4.19 seconds on Test Block 4. Mean
latch manipulation times are shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Latch manipulation times over Training and Test blocks
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Although additional training with the latch appears to have reduced its difficulty
for children, there was still evidence of significant disruption in performance during the
Test phase [t (13) = -3.93, p < .001; mean Baseline = 3.46, mean Test = 4.21], Average
search performance ranged from 3 to 5.5 searches (mean = 4.21), and performance
changes ranged from a decrease of 0.5 to an increase of 1.5 searches from Baseline to
Test (mean = .75).
We again examined the data for evidence of a relation between the duration of
latch manipulation and the likelihood of error. On trials where two boxes were empty
(thus only one reward remained), no correlation was found between the proportion
correct and either latch manipulation time (r = .03) or delay (r = .05). As in the Action
group, no significant differences were found between latch manipulation times (or delay)
on correct and incorrect trials. Mean latch time on correct trials was 5.80 seconds, and
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5.95 seconds on incorrect trials [1 ( 1 2) = .42, p < .89], Mean delay was 7. 1 6 seconds on
correct trials and 7.19 seconds for incorrect trials [t (12) = .02, p < .98],
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The cunent study investigated the nature of attention based cognition-action
resource conflicts in young children through the use of a dual task design. In this study,
we combined a primary, cognitive task (nonspatial working memory search) with a
secondary, action task (latch manipulation). In any such dual task paradigm, it is
presumed that if both tasks tap common processing or attentional resources, performance
on one or both tasks will suffer. Although it is equally possible for performance on a
secondary task to deteriorate as a result of resource conflicts (e.g. Boudreau & Bushnell,
2001; Wagner, Nusbaum, & Goldin-Meadow, 2004), the current study was designed to
measure performance changes in the primary search task.
We predicted that the secondary motor task would require controlled processing
resources, due to the difficulty of the novel action sequence necessary to open the latch.
In demanding controlled processing, the action task enlists dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), the presumed locus of a central attentional executive (Shallice & Burgess,
1993). Because the primary nonspatial working memory search task similarly recruits
DLPFC (Petrides, 1995), we expected that competition for these shared processing
resources would lead to a decrease in search performance, with the largest decreases in
the Action group (for whom processing load was greatest), and smallest decreases in the
Observation group (who experienced only an additional delay).
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As expected, the addition of a secondary task had a substantial impact on
children’s search performance during the Test phase. Children in all groups showed a
significant increase in the number of searches required to successfully empty all three
boxes. The data also showed some indications that these performance effects may have
differed between groups. Mean search performance was highest for the Action group, at
5.24 searches, followed by the Observation group, at 4.80 searches, and lowest for the
Training group, at 4.21 searches, with analyses revealing the Training group required
significantly fewer searches than either Action or Observation groups. Furthermore,
only 3 (of 14) children in the Training group performed worse than chance during the
Test phase, compared to 6 in the Action group, and 8 in the Observation group. On all
measures of search and latch performance, mean scores for the Action group were worse
than for the Training group. However, due to the considerable variability in the
magnitude of these effects between children, few statistically significant effects were
found. Moreover, the design of the current study made significant performance decreases
somewhat less likely. In order to be included in analyses, children were required to
perform better than chance during the Baseline phase, and children in the Action and
Training groups who were unable to open the latch (or found it too frustrating) failed to
complete the session. As a result, all children included in analyses had demonstrated
proficiency on the search task, and those in the Training and Action groups had some
skill with the latch. It is possible that these children may have been more resistant to the
differential effects of the additional processing load introduced during the Test phase.
As noted, the majority of analyses failed to find significant performance
differences between groups. When comparing change scores, all groups showed a similar
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decrease in search performance from Baseline to Test. Having no direct measure of the
cognitive load imposed by the latch task, we used the duration of latch manipulation as an
indication of difficulty, with longer latch manipulations pointing to greater difficulty and
higher attentional requirements. The data showed no correlation between the duration of
latch manipulation and either mean search performance or likelihood of error on
individual trials, suggesting that increased difficulty was not associated with greater task
interference and poorer search performance. Despite some indications that the secondary
latch task may have interfered less with search performance in the Training group (for
whom controlled processing requirements were reduced), overall it appears that search
performance was disrupted similarly across groups, without regard to the type of
secondary task, or the level of controlled processing it required.
Given this unexpected pattern of search performance, it may be useful to examine
a number of assumptions underlying the current design, and consider alternate
explanations that may better capture the current data. The central premise of the current
study is that both the primary search task and the secondary latch task should tap similar
cognitive and neural processing resources, particularly DLPFC. Previous research with
monkeys (Petrides, 1995) and humans (Diamond, et al., 1997) provides evidence that
nonspatial working memory search tasks do in fact recruit DLPFC. Perhaps, though, the
latch component failed to engage DLPFC; if the latch component was not sufficiently
difficult, or the action sequence not novel enough, controlled processing would not be
necessary, and task interference would not be expected to occur.
In the absence of neuroimaging data, it is impossible to state with any certainty
the locus of neural control for the latch manipulation in this study. However, the data
do
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suggest that children initially found the latch component quite difficult. Apart from the
frustration many children expressed with the latch task, it took children a substantial
amount of time to manipulate and open the latch. While facility with the latch varied
considerably, children in the Action group required on average nearly 12 seconds of
active manipulation to successfully open the latch in their first encounters with the task
(first Test block). Similarly, during the initial Training phase, children in the Training
group took an average of about 10 seconds of manipulation to open the latch. It seems
unlikely that such time frames would be necessary for an easy motor task requiring only
automatic processing.
Furthermore, with training and practice, the difficulty of the latch task appears to
have been reduced. By the fourth block of Test trials, mean latch manipulation times for
the Action group fell to only 4.21 seconds. Likewise, after the Training phase, mean
latch manipulation times decreased to 5.48 seconds by the first Test block, and to 4.19
seconds by the fourth Test block. Based on these data, it seems reasonable to conclude
that, at least initially, the latch task was sufficiently challenging to engage significant
attentional resources, requiring controlled processing, and activating DLPFC.
A second possible explanation for the current results is that the decreases seen in
search performance from Baseline to Test may be attributable largely to the imposition of
an additional delay during the Test phase, rather than the cognitive processing necessary
for the latch task. During this delay period, children must maintain representations for
previous successful and unsuccessful searches in working memory. Search pertomiance
may suffer as working memory becomes overtaxed by an extended delay, and previous
searches are forgotten. In support of this notion, no ditferences were found in the Test
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phase search performance of Action and Observation groups. Recall that these two
groups were matched on total delay, with the only procedural difference between the
groups being whether the child or experimenter opened the latch (Action and Observation
groups, respectively).
However, there is also reason to be skeptical of a purely memory based
explanation. In the three location search task used by Diamond and colleagues (1997),
after which the current study’s search task was modeled, all children were exposed to a 5
second delay while the box locations were changed between searches. Even with this
delay, 24 month old children performed better than chance on the search task. The basic
search task in the current study actually places fewer demands on working memory, both
in terms of duration of delay, and perceptual support for memory. The median length of
delay for Action and Observation groups was 4 seconds - less than the delay in the
version employed by Diamond et al. (1997). Furthermore, in the current study, children
were allowed to maintain visual contact with the boxes throughout the entire session, in
contrast to Diamond et al. (1997), where an opaque screen prevented sight of the boxes
during the delay period. With similar lengths of delay, and increased perceptual support,
we would not expect children in the current study to perform worse on the search task
than in Diamond et al. (1997) - as they do - if memory demands were the only source of
difficulty.
Finally, the current results also provide evidence against an interpretation that
memory demands form the core difficulty in children’s search. If the additional delay
imposed during Test trials was the sole, or primary, cause of search performance
disruption, we would expect to see a relation between the duration of this delay and the
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magnitude ofperformance changes. Longer delays would be expected to tax working
memory to a larger degree, and result in poorer search performance. However, no
correlation was found between the total delay time and either mean search performance
or likelihood of error on a given trial. While it is possible that the additional memory
demands present in the Test phase may have contributed to disruptions in search
performance, previous research, as well as the current results, make it seem unlikely that
memory demands were the primary cause of these disruptions.
It appears, then, that we have in the current study presented children with two
experimental tasks, each of which most likely demands processing resources of the
central attentional executive (located in DLPFC). Significant disruptions in search
performance, not attributable solely to memory demands, were observed with the
introduction of a secondary task. Yet the expected, differential effects of interference
between these two tasks were largely absent. Those conditions which required controlled
processing (Action group) showed no added interference compared to conditions with
lessened (Training group) or no (Observation group) controlled processing requirements.
A final, and perhaps more likely, alternative to consider is the possibility that the
primary search and secondary action tasks are indeed recruiting the same cognitive
resources, but in a sequential, rather than parallel, fashion. The latch task was designed
to be a component of the overall nonspatial working memory search task, such that
children would perceive the latch manipulation as a subgoal or problem which must be
solved en route to accessing the hiding boxes and obtaining a reward. As such, we
believed that children would maintain their engagement with the search task while they
solved the latch component, and processing for both tasks would take place concurrently.
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However, the greatest disruptions in children’s search performance occurred with the
introduction of the secondary task during Test trials, without regard to the specific
demands imposed by various latch conditions. Search performance appears to be
disturbed by the very fact of introducing a second task, regardless of that task’s difficulty.
This raises the question whether children are in fact perceiving the study as a single task
with related components or subgoals, or instead as a series of unrelated tasks between
which they must repeatedly switch their attention. Upon introduction of the latch task,
whether it requires manipulation or merely observation, children may disengage from the
primary task, and focus on the latch, reengaging their attention on the search task only
when the latch has been opened and the boxes become accessible again. If this is the
case, the search and action tasks are not likely to suffer substantial interference effects -
even if both require significant controlled processing - because the demands they place
on a central executive are not fully concurrent.
Thus, the primary costs to search performance seem to be incurred as children
encounter a new task and shift their focus away from the initial task. If there are any
differential effects of the controlled processing requirements imposed by the secondary
action task, they are masked by the significant effects of disengaging and reengaging with
the primary search task. Future research could explore this possibility more explicitly,
investigating the conditions under which such disengagement and reengagement may
interfere with performance on a primary task. In addition, subsequent work could design
and employ a set of tasks which are more genuinely concurrent in their processing
demands, making it possible to uncover interference effects on either cognition, action, or
both. Such work would help to provide a clearer exploration of the role ot a central
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attentional executive in managing the concurrent processing demands of cognition and
APPENDIX A
BASELINE PHASE DATA
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Table 2. Number of Searches on Baseline Trials: Action Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
11 3 3 4 3 3.25
14 5 3 4 5 4.25
18 3 5 6 3 4.25
21 4 3 8 4 4.75
24 3 4 6 5 4.5
26 3 3 7 3 4
27 3 6 4 4 4.25
28 3 3 5 6 4.25
37 4 7 4 4 4.75
49 3 3 6 3 3.75
54 8 3 4 4 4.75
57 3 3 6 7 4.75
58 4 5 4 4 4.25
59 4 3 4 4 3.75
Mean 3.79 3.86 5.14 4.21 4.25
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Table 3. Number of Searches on Baseline Trials: Observation Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
31 4 3 3 3 3.25
32 3 3 3 5 3.50
33 5 4 5 4 4.50
34 3 3 5 3.67
36 6 4 4 3 4.25
38 3 3 7 4 4.25
39 3 3 3 3 3.00
53 3 3 3 4 3.25
55 3 6 3 5 4.25
62 3 8 3 3 4.25
65 7 4 3 4 4.50
67 3 8 3 3 4.25
68 3 5 6 3 4.25
69 3 3 3 3 3.00
Mean 3.71 4.29 3.77 3.71 3.87
48
Table 4. Number of Searches on Baseline Trials: Training Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Mean
43 3 4 3.50
44 3 3 3.00
45 4 3 3.50
46 3 3 3.00
51 3 3 3.00
52 3 6 4.50
56 4 4 4.00
61 4 5 4.50
63 3 3 3.00
64 3 3 3.00
70 5 4 4.50
73 3 3 3.00
74 3 3 3.00
76 3 3 3.00
Mean 3.36 3.57 3.46
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Table 5. Number of Errors on Baseline Trials: Action Group
Participant Box Position Joint Other Total
11 1 0 0 0 1
14 0 2 0 3 5
18 1 0 1 3 5
21 2 1 3 2 8
24 2 1 2 1 6
26 1 0 1 2 4
27 3 0 1 1 5
28 2 1 1 1 5
37 4 1 1 1 7
49 1 0 0 2 3
54 1 1 2 4 8
57 2 1 1 3 7
58 4 0 0 1 5
59 2 0 0 1 3
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Table 6. Number of Errors on Baseline Trials: Observation Group
Participant Box Position Joint Other Total
31 0 1 0 0 1
32 0 0 1 1 2
33 1 1 0 4 6
34 0 1 0 1 2
36 1 1 3 0 5
38 0 4 1 0 5
39 0 0 0 0 0
53 0 1 0 0 1
55 1 1 1 2 5
62 0 1 1 3 5
65 1 1 1 3 6
67 0 4 0 2 6
68 1 1 1 2 5
69 0 0 0 0 0
51
Table 7. Number of Errors on Baseline 1 rials: Training Group
Participant Box Position Joint Other Total
43 0 0 1 0 1
44 0 0 0 0 0
45 0 1 0 0 1
46 0 0 0 0 0
51 0 0 0 0 0
52 0 1 1 1 3
56 1 0 1 0 2
61 1 0 2 0 3
63 0 0 0 0 0
64 0 0 0 0 0
70 0 2 0 1 3
73 0 0 0 0 0
74 0 0 0 0 0
76 0 0 0 0 0
52
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Table 8. Latch Manipulation Times on Training Trials: Training Group
Participant Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Mean
43 - -
-
-
_
44 3.4 1.07 2.67 3.5 1.7 2.23 2.43
45 14.23 5.3 2.57 1.63 4.07 6.93 5.79
46 1.37 1.7 1.17 0.9 1.47 0.77 1.63
51 9.6 3.77 6.73 2.1 9.1 11.23 7.09
52 2.23 6.4 3.97 1.33 1.1 0.8 2.64
56 3.4 1.83 5.53 1.5 1.8 1.33 2.57
61 29.17 16.59 6.7 3.64 1 _ 11.42
63 11.43 12.97 60.17 2.2 2.37 3.07 15.37
64 27.73 15.8 21.97 8.27 30.1 _ 20.77
70 24 31.93 4.73 5.06 8.3 6.83 13.48
73 10.1 3.23 11.6 6.57 4.13 1 6.11
74 6.5 47.92 49.07 44.08 52.77 21.23 36.93
76 14.27 3.43 1.83 5.9 3.57 9.5 6.42
Mean 12.11 11.69 13.75 6.67 9.34 5.90 10.20
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Table 9. Latch Delay Times on Training Trials: Training Group
Participant Trial 1 Trial 2 Trial 3 Trial 4 Trial 5 Trial 6 Mean
43 - - -
-
_
44 6.8 1.07 2.67 3.5 1.7 2.23 3.00
45 14.23 8.07 2.57 1.63 4.07 10 6.76
46 1.37 1.7 1.17 0.9 1.47 0.77 1.63
51 12.1 3.77 9.2 8.03 20.23 27.6 13.49
52 2.23 6.4 3.97 1.33 1.1 0.8 2.64
56 3.4 1.83 5.53 1.5 1.8 1.33 2.57
61 61.63 32.77 6.7 4.53 1 _ 21.33
63 19.13 12.97 80.57 2.2 2.37 3.07 20.05
64 40.97 22.33 25.2 8.27 142.93 _ 47.94
70 72.2 41.37 9.8 7.83 8.3 25.4 27.48
73 10.1 3.23 17.83 9.37 7.03 1 8.09
74 6.5 76.17 73.07 108.23 77.33 15.7 59.50
76 23.5 3.43 1.83 5.9 3.57 9.5 7.96
Mean 21.09 16.55 18.47 12.56 20.99 8.85 17.11
55
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Table 10. Number of Searches on Test Trials: Action Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
Change
(Test - Baseline)
11 8 4 4 3 4.75 1.5
14 8 7 6 5 6.5 2.25
18 5 8 6 8 6.75 2.5
21 8 8 8 - 8 3.25
24 3 7 5 4 4.75 0.25
26 3 5 6 4 4.5 0.5
27 6 5 5 3 4.75 0.5
28 3 3 3 5 3.5 -0.75
37 5 5 5 5 5 0.25
49 4 3 5 5 4.25 0.5
54 3 6 4 5 4.5 -0.25
57 5 8 4 5 5.5 0.75
58 3 3 6 4 4 -0.25
59 4 8 7 - 6.33 2.58
Mean 4.86 5.71 5.29 4.67 5.22 0.97
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Table 1 1 . Number of Searches on I est Trials: Observation Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
Change
(Test - Baseline)
31 3 3 4 5 3.75 0.50
32 4 6 7 5 5.50 2.00
33 5 5 3 5 4.50 0.00
34 3 7 3 4 4.25 0.58
36 5 5 6 5 5.25 1.00
38 4 8 5 5 5.50 1.25
39 4 4 3 5 4.00 1.00
53 5 6 4 5 5.00 1.75
55 4 3 4 3 3.50 -0.75
62 4 6 5 6 5.25 1.00
65 5 5 5 6 5.25 0.75
67 6 4 4 8 5.50 1.25
68 5 5 3 3 4.00 -0.25
69 3 8 7 6 6.00 3.00
Mean 4.29 5.36 4.50 5.07 4.80 0.93
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Table 12. Number of Searches on Test Trials: Training Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
Change
(Test - Baseline)
43 5 5 6 4 5 1.5
44 5 6 3 4 4.5 1.5
45 3 5 7 5 5 1.5
46 3 3 3 3 3 0
51 5 3 4 4 1
52 6 5 8 3 5.5 1
56 4 3 3 4 3.5 -0.5
61 5 4 3 5 4.25 -0.25
63 4 4 3 4 3.75 0.75
64 3 3 4 5 3.75 0.75
70 3 6 4 4 4.25 -0.25
73 4 8 3 3 4.5 1.5
74 4 4 3 5 4 1
76 3 5 3 5 4 1
Mean 4.07 4.57 4.07 4.15 4.21 0.75
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Table 13. Number of Errors on Test Trials: Action Group
Participant Box Position Joint Other Total
11 1 3 1 3 8
14 3 3 8 0 14
18 2 6 4 2 14
21 2 3 6 6 17
24 0 1 6 0 7
26 0 2 4 0 6
27 2 3 1 1 7
28 0 2 0 0 2
37 2 4 1 1 8
49 3 0 1 1 5
54 2 1 3 0 6
57 1 4 4 2 11
58 2 0 1 1 4
59 9 0 1 1 11
60
Table 14. Number of Errors on Test Trials: Observation Group
Participant Box Position Joint Other Total
31 1 1 1 0 3
32 1 4 4 1 10
33 0 1 1 4 6
34 3 0 2 0 5
36 1 4 3 1 9
38 2 4 3 1 10
39 2 1 0 1 4
53 3 1 3 1 8
55 0 1 1 0 2
62 0 7 2 0 9
65 0 4 5 0 9
67 3 2 3 2 10
68 2 0 1 1 4
69 4 3 2 4 13
61
Table 15. Number of Errors on Test Trials: Training Group
Participant Box Position Joint Other Total
43 0 3 4 1 8
44 2 0 2 2 6
45 3 1 4 0 8
46 0 0 0 0 0
51 1 0 0 2 3
52 4 3 1 3 11
56 1 0 0 1 2
61 2 1 1 1 5
63 3 0 0 0 3
64 1 2 0 0 3
70 1 1 2 1 5
73 0 1 0 6 7
74 0 3 1 0 4
76 0 2 2 0 4
62
Table 16. Perseveration to Box: Action Group
Participant % to Red % to Blue % to Yellow Perseveration?
11 0.42 0.21 0.37 N
14 0.46 0.31 0.23 N
18 0.35 0.27 0.38 N
21 0.42 0.46 0.13 N
24 0.47 0.32 0.21 N
26 0.39 0.33 0.28 N
27 0.26 0.37 0.32 N
28 0.29 0.43 0.29 N
37 0.30 0.40 0.30 N
49 0.29 0.35 0.35 N
54 0.39 0.33 0.28 N
57 0.36 0.27 0.36 N
58 0.31 0.44 0.25 N
59 0.26 0.63 0.11 Y
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Table 17. Perseveration to Box: Observation Group
Participant % to Red % to Blue % to Yellow Perseveration?
31 0.40 0.33 0.27 N
32 0.32 0.41 0.27 N
33 0.28 0.39 0.33 N
34 0.47 0.29 0.24 N
36 0.29 0.33 0.38 N
38 0.36 0.36 0.27 N
39 0.31 0.31 0.38 N
53 0.40 0.25 0.35 N
55 0.21 0.43 0.29 N
62 0.33 0.33 0.33 N
65 0.38 0.38 0.24 N
67 0.36 0.18 0.45 N
68 0.31 0.38 0.31 N
69 0.25 0.25 0.50 N
64
Table 18. Perseveration to Box: Training Group
Participant % to Red % to Blue % to Yellow Perseveration?
43 0.35 0.35 0.30 N
44 0.39 0.22 0.39 N
45 0.40 0.30 0.30 N
46 0.33 0.33 0.33 N
51 0.25 0.42 0.33 N
52 0.41 0.32 0.27 N
56 0.29 0.29 0.43 N
61 0.47 0.24 0.29 N
63 0.40 0.27 0.33 N
64 0.33 0.27 0.40 N
70 0.41 0.29 0.29 N
73 0.44 0.17 0.39 N
74 0.38 0.31 0.31 N
76 0.44 0.25 0.31 N
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Table 19. Perseveration to Location: Action Group
Participant
Max #
consecutive
% Searches
to Left
% Searches
to Center
% Searches
to Right Perseveration?
11 5 0.37 0.26 0.37 N
14 7 0.04 0.92 0.04 Y
18 6 0.00 0.92 0.08 Y
21 5 0.13 0.67 0.21 N
24 7 0.00 0.84 0.16 Y
26 6 0.00 0.89 0.11 Y
27 5 0.16 0.21 0.58 N
28 4 0.36 0.14 0.50 N
37 5 0.10 0.85 0.05 Y
49 3 0.35 0.59 0.06 N
54 4 0.11 0.78 0.11 Y
57 5 0.05 0.82 0.14 Y
58 2 0.31 0.50 0.19 N
59 4 0.42 0.11 0.47 N
\
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Table 20. Perseveration to Location: Observation Group
Participant
Max #
consecutive
% Searches
to Left
% Searches
to Center
% Searches
to Right Perseveration?
31 3 0.13 0.73 0.13 Y
32 6 0.09 0.23 0.68 Y
33 3 0.00 0.50 0.50 N
34 3 0.24 0.59 0.18 N
36 5 0.05 0.90 0.05 Y
38 5 0.18 0.27 0.55 N
39 3 0.38 0.63 0.00 N
53 4 0.15 0.65 0.20 N
55 3 0.36 0.57 0.07 N
62 6 0.00 0.00 1.00 Y
65 6 0.00 0.48 0.52 N
67 5 0.05 0.36 0.59 N
68 3 0.13 0.44 0.44 N
69 5 0.25 0.46 0.29 N
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Table 21
. Perseveration to Location: Training Group
Participant
Max #
consecutive
% Searches
to Left
% Searches
to Center
% Searches
to Right Perseveration?
43 6 0.00 0.90 0.10 Y
44 4 0.17 0.72 0.11 Y
45 5 0.05 0.80 0.15 Y
46 2 0.42 0.17 0.42 N
51 2 0.42 0.42 0.17 N
52 4 0.50 0.32 0.18 N
56 2 0.50 0.29 0.21 N
61 3 0.00 0.53 0.47 N
63 2 0.20 0.40 0.40 N
64 5 0.00 0.67 0.33 N
70 4 0.88 0.12 0.00 Y
73 2 0.00 0.50 0.50 N
74 5 0.13 0.81 0.06 Y
76 5 0.06 0.88 0.06 Y
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Table 22. Latch Manipulation Times on Test Trials: Action Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
11 4.55 3.03 3.63 3.30 3.63
14 12.76 3.17 2.97 2.03 5.23
18 9.32 8.13 2.39 2.31 5.54
21 11.32 3.88 2.31 _ 5.84
24 9.21 5.84 1.96 2.20 4.80
26 8.98 2.34 2.24 3.45 4.25
27 23.36 11.83 10.52 6.10 12.96
28 3.62 5.56 25.44 13.36 12.00
37 10.93 3.23 2.91 4.41 5.37
49 8.00 6.68 5.99 3.02 5.92
54 3.36 2.56 2.35 1.83 2.53
57 27.04 15.67 8.12 4.91 13.93
58 14.08 9.16 3.87 3.56 7.67
59 16.89 18.04 12.27 - 15.73
Mean 11.67 7.08 6.21 4.21 7.53
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Table 23. Latch Manipulation Times on Test Trials: Training Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
43 1.77 1.50 1.46 2.05 1.70
44 2.83 3.20 4.67 1.50 3.05
45 1.85 11.72 7.80 5.97 6.84
46 2.02 2.88 1.12 1.42 1.86
51 5.95 7.66 2.72 _ 5.44
52 1.46 1.16 1.47 1.00 1.27
56 6.22 3.49 3.98 2.86 4.14
61 3.97 3.97 1.48 4.03 3.36
63 1.90 2.35 1.68 2.52 2.11
64 22.69 9.38 3.89 2.36 9.58
70 6.96 12.16 12.59 9.72 10.36
73 6.89 6.90 12.63 5.40 7.95
74 10.22 8.21 10.92 12.35 10.42
76 1.95 2.10 14.75 3.28 5.52
Mean 5.48 5.48 5.80 4.19 5.26
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Table 24. Latch Delay Times on lest I rials: Action Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
11 5.03 3.03 3.63 3.30 3.75
14 19.93 3.17 3.90 2.03 7.26
18 9.32 8.13 2.39 2.31 5.54
21 14.42 3.88 2.31 _ 6.87
24 10.01 5.84 2.43 2.20 5.12
26 11.65 2.34 2.24 3.45 4.92
27 37.20 14.88 13.43 13.21 19.68
28 3.62 5.99 33.49 25.02 17.03
37 13.24 3.23 3.79 5.14 6.35
49 8.48 6.68 5.99 3.02 6.04
54 3.36 2.56 2.35 1.83 2.53
57 28.39 16.90 8.12 4.91 14.58
58 26.22 11.28 3.87 3.56 11.23
59 34.41 18.99 14.68 - 22.69
Mean 16.09 7.64 7.33 5.83 9.22
71
Table 25. Latch Delay Times on I est Trials: Observation Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
31 5 3 4 3 3.75
32 20 3 4 2 7.26
33 9 8 2 2 5.54
34 12 2 2 3 4.92
36 4 6 33 25 17.03
38 37 15 13 13 19.68
39 10 6 2 2 5.12
53 14 4 2 6.87
55 13 3 4 5 6.35
62 8 7 6 3 6.04
65 3 3 2 2 2.53
67 28 17 8 5 14.58
68 26 11 4 4 11.23
69 34 19 15 22.69
Mean 16.09 7.64 7.33 5.83 9.22
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Table 26. Latch Delay Times on Test Trials: Training Group
Participant Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Mean
43 1.77 1.50 1.46 2.05 1.69
44 2.83 3.20 4.67 3.59 3.57
45 1.85 12.82 7.80 5.97 7.11
46 2.02 3.83 1.12 1.42 2.10
51 8.31 9.45 2.72 6.82
52 1.46 1.16 1.47 1.38 1.37
56 6.22 3.49 3.98 2.86 4.14
61 4.37 4.42 1.48 4.03 3.57
63 1.90 2.35 1.68 2.52 2.11
64 38.75 9.38 3.89 2.36 13.59
70 12.78 16.56 17.52 14.02 15.22
73 8.63 6.90 13.91 5.40 8.71
74 24.16 8.21 10.92 13.70 14.25
76 1.95 2.10 19.81 3.28 6.78
Mean 8.36 6.10 6.60 4.81 6.50
73
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